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THE GEOMETRY OF VOTING POWER:
WEIGHTED VOTING AND HYPER-ELLIPSOIDS
NICOLAS HOUY AND WILLIAM S. ZWICKER
Abstract. In cases where legislators represent districts that vary in popu-
lation, the design of fair legislative voting rules requires an understanding of
how the number of votes cast by a legislator is related to a measure of her
influence over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of
weighted voting, each based on the intuition that winning coalitions should
be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characteri-
zations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the
Euclidean metric: a separating hyperellipsoid contains all winning coalitions,
and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid’s proportions, and the Hamming weights,
reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose-Banzhaf
voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which
voting powers can serve as voting weights.
1. Introduction: Simple games and weighted voting
In yes-no voting several players vote for or against a proposal. Collective approval
or disapproval is then determined by some decision rule, as modelled by a simple
game G = (N,W). Here N is a finite set of players (voters), and W is a collection
of subsets of N that is monotonic: whenever C ∈ W and C ⊆ D, D ∈ W. If a vote
is taken, C is the resulting set of yes-voters, and the rule specifies collective approval
then C is a winning coalition and we place C ∈ W; if it specifies disapproval then
C is a losing coalition and C ∈ L, W’s complement.
Example 1 (Mathematics Department) Professors R and B cast 1 vote each,
Professor G (the Department’s Chair) casts 2 votes, and approval of a proposal
requires a minimum of 3 votes in favor. The associated simple game is GMath =
(N,W) = ({R,B,G}, {{R,G}, {B,G}, {R,B,G}}). This is an example of a weighted
voting rule, and GMath is a weighted simple game (defined below) with voting
weights wR = wB = 1, wG = 2, and quota 3.
Definition 1.1. A simple game G = (N,W) for which N = {1, 2, . . . n} is weighted
if there exists a vector of real number voting weights w = (w1, . . . wn) together with
a real number quota q such that a coalition C is winning precisely when the total
weight w(C) =
∑
i∈C wi of its members meets or exceeds quota. In this case, we
say that w and q jointly realize G as a weighted game.
We’ll use [q;w1, w2 . . . , wn] to specify weights and quota that realize a weighted
game. Note that one can tell whether a game is weighted without referring to a
quota – if w(C) > w(C ′) holds for each pair C ∈ W, C ′ /∈ W, then some quota
SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION 91B12, 91A12, 05C65. KEYWORDS: WEIGHTED
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can always be inserted between the weight of the heaviest losing coalition and that
of the lightest winning coalition.
Example 2 (Two couples on vacation together) The Romans a and b and the
Greeks γ and δ agree that any proposed detour from their planned vacation route
requires approval of at least one person from each couple.
The corresponding game GCouple is nonweighted, for if the two winning coalitions
C1 = {a, δ} and C2 = {γ, b} swap δ for b, the resulting coalitions C ′1 = {a, b} and
C ′2 = {γ, δ} are both losing. Yet every weighted game is swap robust – a one-for-one
trade between two winning coalitions must leave at least one of them still winning.
This is because any such exchange that lowers C1’s total weight must raise C2’s
total by a corresponding amount.
Swap robustness is necessary for weightedness, but something stronger is needed
for a full characterization. Several such characterizations appear in the literature,
including asummability [9], the greater-than-half property [8], and trade robust-
ness [27]. These properties form a related family, the geometric member of which
is the separating hyperplanes characterization discussed in Sec. 3 (see [29] for a
fuller discussion of this family).
The characterizations we introduce here seem entirely different. The geomet-
ric member of this new clan uses separating hyper-ellipsoids that are “aligned” –
obtained by stretching a hypershere along each coordinate axis. Moreover, these
stretch factors embody an unsuspected relationship between voting weight and in-
fluence, as measured by the Penrose-Banzhaf index of voting power.
Bartheleme´ and Monjardet [2] pioneered the application to voting theory of
the two-step method we use for the characterization via ellipsoids – first convert
Hamming distance to squared Euclidean distance in the hypercube, and then apply
Huyghens’ theorem on the mean. It has also been exploited in [30], [31], and [4].
This approach has the potential to transform any result that entails minimizing a
sum of Hamming distances, and deserves to be better known.
2. Weight VS Influence: Penrose-Banzhaf voting power
Interest in the theory of weighted voting has been sparked by its history as a
real voting method. John Banzhaf’s seminal 1965 article, “Weighted voting doesn’t
work” [1] originated as a critique of a draft written by one of his professors, made
while he was a student at Columbia Law School.1 In the period 1962 − 1964 the
U.S. Supreme Court had issued a series of decisions that established a precedent
favoring the one person, one vote principle. Several states had been using voting
districts of greatly varying population size; the court struck down these rules, on
the grounds that the influence of an individual vote might depend heavily on the
district within which it was cast. The professor’s draft argued that one way to
implement the court’s principle (short of continually redrawing district lines so
as to equalize district populations) would be to use weighted voting, with each
representative given a voting weight proportional to the population of her district.
Banzhaf saw a flaw in this reasoning. Voting weight can be wildly dispropor-
tionate to influence. For example [51; 49, 49, 2] and [2; 1, 1, 1] represent the same
1We are borrowing heavily from Felsenthal and Machover [10], which devotes a chapter to
recounting a much more complete history of weighted voting in the US, and of associated court
cases. A later article [12] by these authors takes up the history of voting power more broadly.
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voting rule – majority rule for 3 voters. Yet voter 1 cannot have 24.5 times as much
influence as voter 3 and simultaneously have the same influence . . . at least one of
these weight vectors must misrepresent influence.2 Our reasoning here contains an
implicit assumption that a voter’s “influence” can be meaningfully measured by a
single number, but otherwise does not turn on any precise definition of “influence,”
resting instead on wiggle room – the sometimes considerable extent to which voting
weights can vary while representing the same game.3 However, a precise definition
seems necessary if we wish to address two related issues:
QUESTION 1 “Is there always some choice of voting weights that perfectly reflects
influence?”
QUESTION 2 “How can we choose voting weights for legislators in a representa-
tive assembly so that they appropriately reflect population differences among the
districts represented?”4
So, how should we measure the influence of a voter in a simple game? In [1],
Banzhaf argues that we should count instances in which a voter is critical or deci-
sive, swinging the outcome of the collective decision. The resulting index (defined
below) has come to be known as Banzhaf voting power. However, in 1946 the statis-
tician Lionel Penrose had proposed the identical measure in an article [24] that did
not attract much attention at the time. Penrose’s work was later pointed out by
Morriss [23], then by Felsenthal and Machover [10], and later by others.
Definition 2.1. Let G = (N,W) be a simple game, with i ∈ N . Then Wi denotes
{C ∈ W | i ∈ C}, W¬i denotes {C ∈ W | i /∈ C}, Wcrit i denotes {C ∈ Wi | C −
{i} /∈ W}, Wnotcrit i denotes {C ∈ Wi | C − {i} ∈ W}, and ηi = |Wcrit i| – the
raw Penrose-Banzhaf voting power of i – counts the number of winning coalitions
in which voter i is critical.
The following lemma provides one of several well-known, equivalent expressions
for ηi. The proof follows immediately from the bijection between the setsWnotcrit i
and W¬i given by C 7→ C \ {i}.
Lemma 2.2. Let G = (N,W) be a simple game, with i ∈ N .
Then ηi = |Wi| − |W¬i|.
2In this particular example it is easy to see that the three voters play symmetric roles; every
permutation ofN is an automorphism of the simple game, and so one can argue that any reasonable
measure of influence should assign equal amounts to the three voters. The example roughly models
the situation prevailing in the Israeli Knesset during the late 1980s. Both Labor and Likud
held large blocs of seats, but neither could form a ruling (majority) coalition without cutting
deals with some small ultra-orthodox religious parties. These small parties wielded considerable
bargaining power in the negotiations. The resulting controversy helped drive a change in Israel’s
parliamentary system to one in which the prime minister was elected by direct popular vote (see
[3]), but that change was abolished in 2001.
3One alternatives is to measure influence with an interval of numbers; see [28].
4By “appropriately reflect population differences” we do not necessarily mean directly in pro-
portion to population. If we view such a representative assembly as a two-tier voting rule in which
individual citizens, when they elect their representatives, are in effect voting on the legislation
itself, then there is an argument (which goes back to the original articles of Penrose and Banzhaf)
that equalizing the influence of these citizens requires the voting powers of representatives to be
in proportion to the square roots of their district populations.
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It is typical to divide the raw Penrose-Banzhaf voting power ηi by 2
n−1 (which
allows a probabilistic interpretation5) or by
∑n
i=1 ηi (to normalize, although this
approach has been sharply criticized). However, we’ll be concerned only with the
relative proportions of voting power among the voters, so we’ll identify ηi itself with
i’s Penrose-Banzhaf voting power.
The measure of Penrose and Banzhaf is not the only one possible, nor even the
first to attract widespread attention – that distinction belongs to the alternative
approach of Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik [26]. Our exclusive focus, in this
paper, on Penrose-Banzhaf voting power is due to the role that it plays in the
theorems of sections 4 and 6, rather than any inclination to carry a spear for either
side in the voting power wars.
Before [1] even appeared, Banzhaf learned of a weighted voting case that was
to be heard by the the New York Court of Appeals, involving weighted voting
systems proposed in Washington and Saratoga counties, which would have used
voting weights proportional to population. Banzhaf submitted an amicus curae
brief, which included the galley proofs of his article. The court found Banzhaf’s
reasoning to be compelling, judging the proposed rules to be unconstitutional and
referring to Banzhaf’s work in their decision.
One might think that Saratoga’s fate had settled the issue, at least for counties
within New York State. But recent events show that not to be the case. The
county of Schenectady adjoins that of Saratoga, lying just to its south.6 On May
10, 2011, the 15-person Schenectady County Legislature voted to change from the
then current “one-legislator-one-vote” rule, to a weighted rule (effective in 2012),
in which the voting weights range from a low of 0.9048 to a high of 1.0799. These
weights add to 15 and are chosen to be proportional, based on the 2010 Census, to
the population share of each representative (equal to the district population divided
by the number of representatives from that district, with 4 districts and from 3 to
5 representatives per district). Population shifts had forced some change to the
old system, because the variance among population shares would otherwise have
exceeded a state-mandated cap.
However, with the new weights, the heaviest 7 legislators have a total weight of
7.4052 (less than half of 15), while the lightest 8 weigh 7.5948. Most issues use
weighted majority rule; that is, the quota is 7.5 (or 7.5001 – with these weights,
it doesn’t matter). Thus, although the new system presumably satisfies the state
mandate and the old one would have violated it, the two systems are identical for
such issues, with all legislators having equal influence. Certain budgetary matters,
however, require a two-thirds (weighted) majority for approval, and here the story
is quite different. With a quota of 10 the effect of the newly-approved weights is
substantial; the heaviest legislator has a bit more than 19% more voting weight
(or population-share) than the lightest, but has almost 77% more Penrose-Banzhaf
voting power!
A recent series of expansions of the European Union has also played a role in
inspiring research on voting power ([11], [15], [16], [18], and [19] are a sample). The
5Consider the probability distribution p? that assigns equal probability to every coalition D
of N \ {i}. Then ηi
2n−1 is the probability that D is losing and D ∪ {i} is winning. We can obtain
p? by assuming that each voter independently tosses a fair coin to decide whether to vote “yes”
or “no.”
6Union College (the home institution of one of the authors of the paper you are now reading)
lies in Schenectady County.
THE GEOMETRY OF VOTING POWER: WEIGHTED VOTING AND HYPER-ELLIPSOIDS8 5
EU’s Council of Ministers has used weighted voting (as well as more complex rules
that incorporate a weighted-voting component); each such expansion results in a
sometimes spirited debate over changes to the previous voting weights.
Before moving on, it seems appropriate to situate the role of this paper within
the context limned by the questions posed at the start of this section. For Ques-
tion 1, as applied to either of the two particular power indices mentioned here, the
simple answer is “No – we cannot always find a weight assignment that accurately
reflects influence.” A smallest counterexample is provided by the weighted game
[3; 2, 1, 1, 1];7 both the Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices assign to the
heavy player exactly thrice the voting power of a light player. No weighted rep-
resentation can assign that much weight to the heavy player, because her weight
alone would then match that of the winning coalition consisting of the three light
players, yet she does not, alone, form a winning coalition. Such an example demon-
strates that the mismatch between weight and influence goes beyond what can be
explained in terms of wiggle-room alone.
A follow-up question might then be:
QUESTION 1B: For which weighted voting rules does some choice of voting weights
accurately reflect influence?
There is a small literature ([7], [20], [21], and [22]) on “Penrose’s limit theorem”
(originally a conjecture of L. S. Penrose), showing that under certain circumstances,
voting power tends to approximate voting weight when the number of voters is
sufficiently large. With this important exception, however, 1B has received no
attention in the literature, suggesting that it has not been seen as interesting. Our
characterization of such rules (Section 6) in terms of spherical separability (for the
Penrose-Banzhaf case) argues that that view might be up for revision.
Question 2 (tying the matter of choosing a measure of voting power with that
of designing a fair voting rule) is, of course, very broad – arguably, it lies behind
almost every one of the many papers that have been written on voting power. For
the reader interested in learning more about the measurement of voting power,
we recommend the books by Felsenthal and Machover [10] and by Laruelle and
Valenciano [17].
3. Geometrization and hyperplane separation
Once we identify the set N of voters with an initial segment {1, 2, . . . , n} of
natural numbers, each subset X ⊆ N corresponds to a characteristic vector x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) for which xi = 1 if i ∈ X and xi = 0 if not. Each such vector is
boolean (it consists of 0s and 1s) and provides the coordinates of a vertex of the unit
(hyper)cube in Rn – the n-cube. In this way, we can label each n-cube vertex with
a corresponding coalition of voters. In terms of Example 1 (sec.1), if we identify
voters R, B, and G with the x, y, and z axes respectively, then we obtain the
labeled 3-cube of Fig. 1.
Notice that the shaded plane M of this figure, with equation x + y + 2z = 2.5,
slices the cube so that winning coalitions are all strictly to one side of M and losing
coalitions are all strictly to the other side – M is a separating hyperplane for the
simple game GMath of Example 1.
7We are grateful to Josep Freixas amd Moshe´ Machover for pointing out this example.
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Figure 1. The 3-cube, with a separating hyperplane for GMath
The weight of coalition RG, for example, is 3 = w(R) + w(G) = 1 + 0 +
2 = (1, 1, 2) · (1, 0, 1) = (w1, w2, w3) · (x1, x2, x3) = w · x, the dot product of the
weight vector w with the characteristic vector x of the coalition RG. Each winning
coalition Y of GMath similarly satisfies w · y ≥ 3 > 2.5, while each losing coalition
Z makes w · z ≤ 2 < 2.5. This explains why the plane M with equation w ·x = 2.5
strictly separates GMath.
8 A straightforward generalization of this example leads
to the following:
Theorem 3.1. A simple game is weighted if and only if the winning and losing
coalitions can be strictly separated by a hyperplane. In particular, a vector is normal
to some strictly separating hyperplane if and only if it serves as a vector of voting
weights for the game.
While our minds are on Fig. 1 it seems appropriate to note a key relationship
between the Hamming and Euclidean metrics for n-cube vertices – a very simple
observation that we will need for our final characterization in Sec. 6. The Hamming
distance between boolean vectors x and y is equal to number of coordinates at which
the vectors differ: H(x,y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}|. For subsets X and Y of our voter set
N , we will abuse terminology by using “Hamming distance between coalitions”
or “H(X,Y )” to refer to the Hamming distance H(x,y) between their respective
characteristic vectors, which coincides with the cardinality |X∆Y | of the coalitions’
symmetric difference. For such characteristic vectors x, y the squared Euclidean
distance ‖x − y‖2 is a sum of terms ‖xi − yi‖2, each of which has value 0 (when
xi = yi) or 1 (when xi 6= yi), and this sum has the same value as H(x,y):
Proposition 3.2. Hamming distance between two coalitions equals squared Eu-
clidean distance between their respective characteristic vectors: H(X,Y ) = ‖x−y‖2.
4. Weighted Hamming distance and two characterizations of
weighted voting
Throughout this section:
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
• G = (N,W) is a simple game
8Weaker forms of hyperplane separation also do service in the mathematics of voting. Weak
separability allows the hyperplane to intersect the two sets being separated, while neat separability
demands that any such intersection be the same for both sets; these notions play roles in the
theory of roughly weighted simple games (see [13], [14] and [29]), and of generalized scoring rules
for multicandidate elections (see [5], [30] and [31]), respectively.
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• η = (η1, η2, . . . , ηn) is the vector of raw Penrose-Banzhaf voting powers for
the voters of G
• b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) is a vector of nonnegative real numbers (the Hamming
weights)
• and w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) is a vector of nonnegative real numbers (the
voting weights).
We will write w = ηb when wi = ηibi holds for each i. When E and F are subsets
of N , their weighted Hamming distance is given by Hb(E,F ) =
∑
i∈E∆F
bi. When
F is a subset of N and V is a set of subsets of N we similarly define Hb(V, F ) =∑
E∈V
Hb(E,F ) and Hb(V) =
∑
E,F∈V
Hb(E,F ).
We’ll say that G is locally Hamming minimal via b if whenever E ∈ W,
E′ /∈ W, and W ′ =W \ {E} ∪ {E′} (W and W ′ are “neighbors”) we have
Hb(W) < Hb(W ′) +Hb(E,E′),
and that G is locally Hamming minimal if it is locally Hamming minimal via some
vector b. The game G is tightly Hamming packed via b if every coalition in W is
closer to W than is any coalition not in W – for every E ∈ W and E′ /∈ W
Hb(W, E) < Hb(W, E′)
– and is tightly Hamming packed if it is tightly Hamming packed via some b.
Our goal is the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. For G = (N,W) any simple game, the following are equivalent:
(i) G is locally Hamming minimal,
(ii) G is tightly Hamming packed,
(iii) G is weighted.
The proof is immediate from:
Proposition 4.2. For G = (N,W) a simple game, b a vector of Hamming weights,
and w = ηb the corresponding vector of voting weights, the following are equivalent:
(i′) G is locally Hamming minimal via b,
(ii′) G is tightly Hamming packed via b,
(iii′) G is weighted via w.
Recalling that a simple game is weighted via weight vector w if and only if w(E′) <
w(E) holds whenever E is a winning coalition and E′ is losing coalition, we see
that proposition 4.2, in turn, follows immediately from:
Lemma 4.3. For G = (N,W) a simple game, E ∈ W, E′ /∈ W, b any vector
of Hamming weights, and w = ηb the corresponding vector of voting weights,9 the
following are equivalent:
(i′′) Hb(W) < Hb(W ′) +Hb(E,E′),
(ii′′) Hb(W, E) < Hb(W, E′),
(iii′′) w(E′) < w(E).
9While the reader should think of b and w as potential choices for Hamming weights and voting
weights, respectively, we are not assuming in this preamble that they are good choices (that witness
local Hamming minimality or tight Hamming packedness, or that provide a weighted represen-
tation for the game); the only actual assumption here is that their components are nonnegative
reals, and that w = ηb.
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The proof of lemma 4.3 will use the following:
Definition 4.4. For G = (N,W) a simple game, and X ⊆ N :
• XC = N \X, X’s complement in N
• Agri(W, X) = {Y ∈ W : i ∈ Y ⇔ i ∈ X}
• Disi(W, X) = {Y ∈ W : i ∈ Y ⇔ i /∈ X}
Proof. For (i′′)⇔ (ii′′): Let P =W \ {E} and W ′ = P ∪ {E′}, so that W and W ′
are neighbors. Then
Hb(W) < Hb(W ′) +Hb(E,E′)
m
Hb(P) +Hb(P, E) < Hb(P) +Hb(P, E′) +Hb(E,E′)
m
Hb(P, E) < Hb(P, E′) +Hb(E,E′)
m
Hb(W, E) < Hb(W, E′).
For (ii′′)⇔ (iii′′):
Hb(W, E) < Hb(W, E′)
m∑
Z∈W
Hb(Z,E) <
∑
Z∈W
Hb(Z,E′)
m∑
Z∈W
∑
i∈Z∆E
bi <
∑
Z∈W
∑
i∈Z∆E′
bi
m∑
i∈N
bi|Disi(W, E)| <
∑
i∈N
bi|Disi(W, E′)|
Breaking each sum in four parts, this is equivalent to
∑
i∈E∩E′
bi|Disi(W, E)|+
∑
i∈EC∩E′C
bi|Disi(W, E)|
+
∑
i∈E\E′
bi|Disi(W, E)|+
∑
i∈E′\E
bi|Disi(W, E)|
<
∑
i∈E∩E′
bi|Disi(W, E′)|+
∑
i∈EC∩E′C
bi|Disi(W, E′)|
+
∑
i∈E\E′
bi|Disi(W, E′)|+
∑
i∈E′\E
bi|Disi(W, E′)|
Eliminating equal terms from both sides then yields∑
i∈E\E′
bi|Disi(W, E)|+
∑
i∈E′\E
bi|Disi(W, E)|
<
∑
i∈E\E′
bi|Disi(W, E′)|+
∑
i∈E′\E
bi|Disi(W, E′)|
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m∑
i∈E′\E
bi (|Disi(W, E)| − |Disi(W, E′)|) <
∑
i∈E\E′
bi (|Disi(W, E′)| − |Disi(W, E)|)
m∑
i∈E′\E
bi (|Agri(W, E′)| − |Disi(W, E′)|) <
∑
i∈E\E′
bi (|Agri(W, E)| − |Disi(W, E)|)
For the next equivalent expression, we add equal quantities to both sides, getting
∑
i∈E′\E
bi (|Agri(W, E′)| − |Disi(W, E′)|) +
∑
i∈E∩E′
bi (|Agri(W, E′)| − |Disi(W, E′)|)
<
∑
i∈E\E′
bi (|Agri(W, E)| − |Disi(W, E)|) +
∑
i∈E∩E′
bi (|Agri(W, E)| − |Disi(W, E)|)
These sums collapse to
∑
i∈E′
bi (|Agri(W, E′)| − |Disi(W, E′)|) <
∑
i∈E
bi (|Agri(W, E)| − |Disi(W, E)|)
m∑
i∈E′
bi (|Wi| − |W¬i|) <
∑
i∈E
bi (|Wi| − |W¬i|)
m∑
i∈E′
biηi <
∑
i∈E
biηi
m
w(E′) < w(E).

The “extra” term Hb(E,E′) in the local Hamming minimality characterization
(i) is disguised (if only lightly) in the characterization via tight packing; the sum
Hb(W, E) includes a term Hb(E,E) that is zero, whereas the corresponding term
Hb(E,E′) in Hb(W, E′) is not zero. But where did the extra term go in the final
equivalent condition (iii′′): w(E′) < w(E)? The last few lines of the preceding
proof suggest it has been completely absorbed into the choice of weight vector w –
if W and W ′ were both weighted, then some alternative choice w′ of weight vector
would make w′(E) < w′(E′). It seems that while the choice of w can thus absorb
this extra term, b cannot fully do so, presumably because some information lies
within the ηi terms that are built in to w but not into b.
5. Euclidean distance and a theorem of Huyghens
A theorem due to Christiaan Huyghens (1629 - 1695) is crucial in transforming
the characterizations of the previous section into terms involving ellipsoids in Eu-
clidean space. Huyghens (also spelled Huygens or Hugens) was a Dutch polymath
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and contemporary of Newton, known for inventing the pendulum clock, and propos-
ing the wave theory of light, among other things. Our interest is in the following:
Theorem 5.1. Huyghens′ Theorem Let S = {si}ri=1 be a finite sequence of
points in Rd, q =
(∑r
j=1 sj
r
)
be the mean location of the points of S, and y be any
point in Rd. Then
∑r
j=1 ‖y − sj‖2 = r‖y − q‖2 +
∑r
j=1 ‖q− sj‖2. (†)
Christiaan Huyghens, the astronomer,
by Caspar Netscher (ca 1637 - 1684)
Fig. 2 illustrates the theorem for the case r = 3.
Figure 2. Huyghens’ Theorem for three points in the plane.
Notice that if each triangle 4yqsj in this figure were right (with right angle at q)
then equation (†) would follow immediately by applying the Pythagorean theorem
separately to the triangles and adding the three resulting equations:
‖y − sj‖2 = ‖y − q‖2 + ‖q− sj‖2.
Of course, the triangles are not actually right, but the underlying idea is correct,
as we’ll see shortly.
First, however, we observe that the theorem has an intimate relationship with
the following proposition, whose well-known proof we skip:
Proposition 5.2. Let S = {si}ri=1 be a finite sequence of points in Rd. Then the
mean location q of the points of S is the point y in Rd that minimizes the sum∑r
j=1 ‖y − sj‖2 of squared Euclidean distances to the points of S.
We’ll use 5.2 in the proof of Huyghens’ theorem (5.1), but it also can be seen
as a corollary of 5.1, as follows: the y that minimizes the left side of eqn.(†) is the
one that minimizes the right side, by minimizing the distance from y to q. More
important is that this same argument actually establishes a corollary of Huyghens’
Theorem stronger than 5.2:
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Corollary 5.3. Let S = {si}ri=1 be a finite sequence of points in Rd, q be the mean
location of the points of S, and Y be any locally compact subset of Rd. Then the
member(s) y of Y closest to q minimize(s)
∑r
j=1 ‖y− sj‖2 among members of Y .
Most, if not all, of the applications of Huyghens’ Theorem to the mathematical
theory of voting (in [2], [30], [31], and [4]) are actually applications of Corollary 5.3
for finite Y . We turn now to the proof of Huyghens’ Theorem.
Proof. Given any sequence U = {ui}ri=1 of r points in Rd (with uj = (uj1, . . . , ujd)
for each j) we will string their coordinates together, forming a single point
uU = (u1,u2, . . . ,ur) = (u11, . . . , u1d, u21, . . . , u2d, . . . , ur1, . . . , urd)
in Rrd. For any x ∈ Rd, x ⊗ r will denote (x,x, . . . ,x) ∈ Rrd. Thus x 7→ x ⊗ r
maps Rd to Rrd; D will stand for the range of this function, a linear subspace of
Rrd.
Consider the triangle in Rrd formed by the points sS , q⊗r, and y⊗r, illustrated
in Fig. 3 for the case r = 3. The angle at q⊗r is right, because we know (from
Proposition 5.2) that, among points of D, q⊗ r is closest to sS . The Pythagorean
Theorem then asserts that
‖y ⊗ r − sS‖2 = ‖y ⊗ r − q⊗ r‖2 + ‖q⊗ r − sS‖2
(C2 = A2 + B2 in Fig. 3). But this is the same as the desired conclusion (†) of
Huyghens’ Theorem. 
Figure 3. A right triangle in Rrd.
6. Separation by aligned hyper-ellipsoids
We are interested in hyper-ellipsoids with equations having the form:
b1(x1 − c1)2 + b2(x2 − c2)2 + · · ·+ bn(xn − cn)2 = r2.
Here c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) is the ellipsoid’s center, and b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) determines
the proportions. Such an ellipsoid is aligned – generated from a sphere by a series
of uniform scalings along the coordinate axes. The ellipsoid is mean-centered with
respect to G = (N,W) if its center coincides with the mean position q of all
characteristic vectors for winning coalitions of G. In this setting, the ellipsoid
separates the winning coalitions from the losing coalitions if all characteristic vectors
of G’s winning coalitions lie strictly within the ellipsoid, while all those of losing
coalitions lie strictly outside (though we show later that these roles can be reversed).
When an aligned and mean-centered separating ellipsoid exists, G is ellipsoidally
separable, and when that separating ellipsoid can be taken to be a sphere G is
spherically separable. Our final characterization of weighted voting is then:
Theorem 6.1. A simple game G = (N,W) is weighted if and only if some aligned
hyper-ellipsoid centered at the mean position q of all winning coalitions separates
G’s winning coalitions from its losing coalitions. In particular the possible vectors
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b of coefficients for such separating ellipsoids are exactly those of the form b = wη
where η is the vector of raw Penrose-Banzhaf voting powers, and w is any vector
of voting weights that realizes G as a weighted game.
The proportions of the separating ellipsoid thus reflect the ratios of voting weights
to voting powers. In particular, an immediate corollary of Theorem 6.1 is:
Corollary 6.2. A simple game G = (N,W) is spherically separable if and only if
the vector of Penrose-Banzhaf voting powers serves as a vector of voting weights in
a weighted representation of the game.
For example, the game GMath (Example 1) is spherically separable.
Why place the center of the separating ellipsoid at the mean of the winning
coalitions? With no restrictions on the center we could place it far away, and
use an ellipsoid so large that the portion of its surface that lay within the n-
cube was arbitrarily close to a section of a plane. With this approach, ellipsoidal
separability would immediately follow from separability via a hyperplane, and be
of little interest.
Our proof of Theorem 6.1 fits together two earlier results: Proposition 3.2, stat-
ing that Hamming distance coincides with squared Euclidean distance, and our
stronger Corollary 5.3 of Huyghens’ Theorem, but requires that we first modify 3.2
so that it applies to weighted Hamming distance. Rather than change the Euclidean
metric itself, we’ll stretch the n-cube into a box with unequal sides, and apply the
standard Euclidean metric as measured between vertices of this box.
Recall that for each coalition X ⊆ N , the corresponding characteristic vector
x of 0s and 1s represents a vertex of the n-cube. Given a vector b of Hamming
weights, let t be the vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) of square roots: tj =
√
bj for each j.
We’ll write t =
√
b, for short. For X ⊆ N , let xt = (xt1, . . . , xtn) be defined by
xti = ti if i ∈ X and xi = 0 if not. These are the coordinate vectors for vertices of
the t-box, a rectangular hyper-solid obtained by scaling the n-cube by a factor of ti
along the ith axis, for each i. It follows that for X,Y ⊆ N , the squared Euclidean
distance ‖xt − yt‖2 = ∑ni=1(xti − yti)2 = ∑i∈X∆Y (ti)2 = ∑i∈X∆Y bi = H(X,Y ),
which proves:
Proposition 6.3. Let t =
√
b be vectors in Rn. Then b-weighted Hamming
distance between two coalitions is the same as squared Euclidean distance between
corresponding vertices of the t-box.
The following extension of Lemma 4.3 is key to our ellipsoidal characterization:
Lemma 6.4. For G = (N,W) a simple game, let E ∈ W, E′ /∈ W, b be any
vector of Hamming weights, w = ηb be the corresponding vector of voting weights,10
t =
√
b, and qt =
∑
F∈W f
t
|W| be the mean position of G’s winning coalitions as located
in the t-box. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) w(E′) < w(E)
(2) ‖et − qt‖ < ‖e′t − qt‖.
Proof. w(E′) < w(E)
⇔(a) Hb(W, E) < Hb(W, E′)
⇔∑F∈W Hb(F,E) <∑F∈W Hb(F,E′)
10This is an opportune time to reread footnote 9.
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⇔∑F∈W ‖et − f t‖2 <∑F∈W ‖e′t − f t‖2
⇔(b) ‖et − qt‖ < ‖e′t − qt‖. Here ⇔(a) follows from Lemma 4.3 and ⇔(b)
represents an application of Corollary 5.3 with Y = {et, e′t}. 
Theorem 6.1 now follows readily from this lemma:
Proof. The vector w represents G as a weighted game
⇔ w(E′) < w(E) holds for every E ∈ W and E′ /∈ W
⇔ ‖et − qt‖ < ‖e′t − qt‖ holds for every E ∈ W and E′ /∈ W
⇔ some sphere centered at qt contains et for every E ∈ W and omits e′t
for every E′ /∈ W.
Next, for each i apply a uniform scaling by a factor of 1ti along the i
th coordinate
axis, reversing the process that converted the n-cube into the t-box. This transform
shifts each et to e, and shifts qt to q.11 It converts the sphere into a mean-centered
and aligned separating hyper-ellipsoid for G, with equation
b1(x1 − q1)2 + b2(x2 − q2)2 + · · ·+ bn(xn − qn)2 = r2
for some r. This last step (of stretching the sphere into an ellipsoid with correspond-
ing center) is clearly reversible, establishing the equivalence between weightedness
and ellipsoidal separability. 
Finally, we explain how the separating ellipsoid of Theorem 6.1 can be taken to
have center at the mean of G’s losing coalitions, and to contain all losing coalitions
while omitting all winning coalitions.12 The idea is to work with the dual Gd =
(N,Wd) of the original game G = (N,W), defined as follows: X ∈ Wd ⇔ N \X ∈
L. That is, a coalition is winning in the dual when it blocks approval in the original
game.
For example, the dual of the weighted game [6; 3, 3, 1, 1, 1] is the weighted game
[4; 3, 3, 1, 1, 1], because to block approval by the required minimum weight of 6 out
of 9, it is enough to have the weight in opposition be at least 4 out of 9. More
generally, G is weighted if and only if its dual is weighted, and the same weight
vectors w represent G and Gd; for details, see [29]. The vector η of raw Penrose-
Banzhaf voting power is also the same for G and Gd – a player i is a critical member
of coalition X, according to G, if and only if i is critical as a member of (N \X)∪{i},
according to Gd.
Now, we first apply Theorem 6.1 to obtain an ellipsoid E for Gd and then apply
the affine transform x 7→ 1− x, where 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Notice that this transform
carries the characteristic vector for X to that for X’s complement, and thus per-
mutes the vertices of the n-cube; in particular, it carries winning coalitions of Gd to
losing coalitions of G. By these remarks, along with footnote 11, it also carries the
mean location of the winning coalition of Gd to the mean of the losing coalitions of
G, and carries E to an ellipsoid containing all of G’s losing coalitions, and omitting
all its winning coalitions.
11Any affine transform L(x) = Ax + B commutes with the mean: if S is a set of points in
Euclidean space, q(S) denotes the mean location of the points in S, and L[S] denotes the set
image of S, then L(q(S)) = q(L[S]).
12We will no longer always be careful to distinguish a coalition from its characteristic vector.
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7. Further thoughts
These results suggest several avenues for future research. In presentations of this
material, the most common audience response has been to ask, “Do these charac-
terizations have analogous versions for the Shapley Shubik voting power index?”
We do not know, but either answer might tell us something about the differences
between the two power indices.13
Because our attention has been drawn here to the class of games for which the
Penrose-Banzhaf voting powers can serve as voting weights, it seems natural to ask
whether there are any other nice characterizations of this class. In particular, does
the class have any normative interpretation – is there any sense in which games
from this class are better choices for real voting rules, because they satisfy some
desirable fairness property?
Fix some point y in space. Next, for each winning coalition X of some weighted
game G, loop one end of an ideal rubber band14 about xt and the other end about
y. Finally, release y so that it seeks a position of equilibrium under the rub-
ber band forces. This resulting position minimizes the potential energy P.E. =
1
2
∑
X∈W ‖xt − y‖2 stored in the rubber bands. Proposition 5.2 implies that the
equilibrium is at qt, the mean position of winning coalitions as located in the t-
box. These ideas have been applied in [4], in a very different voting context; there
P.E. may be interpreted as the total discontent of the voters. For a broad collec-
tion of multi-candidate voting rules, the winning candidate can then be seen to be
the minimizer of total discontent. It seems plausible that P.E. have some related
interpretation for the yes-no type of voting we consider here.
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